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1WHY GOVERNMENT BONDS ARE SOLD BY AUCTION AND
CORPORATE BONDS BY POSTED-PRICE SELLING
1 Introduction
In most industrialized countries, government bonds are sold by auction whereas corporate bonds
are sold by posted-price selling (PPS). The latter form of sale, which is described by Grinblatt
and Titman (1998, p. 58) for example, eﬀectively has the investment bank bringing the issue to
market set the price at which the securities are oﬀered, albeit in consultation with the issuer and
prospective buyers. This is in contrast to auctions, in which the sale price of the securities oﬀered
for sale is obtained from the bids made by the participants in the auction. In the uniform-price
auction used by the Treasury to sell two-year and ﬁve-year notes, for example, the winning bidders
pay the highest losing bid.1
Our purpose in this paper is to provide an explanation for the afore-mentioned empirical regu-
larity. The starting point of our analysis are the observations that i) information about a security
such as a bond is costly to acquire, ii) investors have an incentive to acquire information, and iii)
the cost of the information acquired by investors is ultimately borne by the seller of the security. An
investor who acquires information gains an informational advantage over both the seller and those
investors who have not acquired information, and can expect to proﬁt at their expense. Foreseeing
the losses they will incur to informed investors, uninformed investors shade their bids in case the
security is auctioned, or require from the seller a discount to the expected value of the security in
case the security is sold by PPS.2 Uninformed investors may even withdraw from the sale, thereby
decreasing competition for the security and the seller’s expected proceeds from the sale.
The reduction in the seller’s expected proceeds caused by information acquisition by investors
suggests that the seller would like to prevent such acquisition. This can be achieved by having
the seller post a price that oﬀers investors a discount to the expected value of the security. The
discount is such that investors are indiﬀerent between i) incurring the cost of acquiring information
and exploiting the informational advantage thereby obtained, and ii) refraining from acquiring
information, taking part in the sale, and obtaining the discount.
In contrast, no such prevention is possible in the case of an auction. This is because the sale
price in an auction is set not by the investment bank bringing the security to market, but by the
bids submitted. Under such conditions, the expected payoﬀ of an uninformed bidder is at most zero
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982b), and only those investors who have acquired information will place
1See Bikchandani and Huang (1993) for an analysis of the Treasury securities markets.
2See Milgrom and Weber (1982a) for auctions and Rock (1987) for PPS.
2bids in an auction. Under conditions of free entry into the auction, a bidder’s expected payoﬀ from
placing a bid therefore equals the cost of acquiring information. As the seller’s payoﬀ equals the
expected value of the security minus the bidders’ expected payoﬀs, the seller’s expected proceeds
equal the expected value of the security minus the combined cost of information acquisition.3
Of course, the discount granted the buyer under PPS is costly to the seller but, under some
conditions, it is less costly than the alternative of having the investor acquire information in an
auction. We shall show the underpricing in an auction to be higher than the discount oﬀered under
PPS when the cost of information acquisition is high, and lower when this cost is low.
Intuitively, a high discount must be oﬀered under PPS in order to prevent investors from
acquiring information when the cost of information acquisition is low. In the limit, when information
is costless, only a price equal to the lower bound on the value of the security can deter investors
from acquiring information under PPS. In contrast, costless information reduces the auction to one
with no entry costs. Should a suﬃciently large number of investors then enter the auction, the
price should converge to the expected value of the security (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1981).
When the cost of information acquisition is relatively high, little or no discount to the expected
value of the security must be oﬀered investors in order to deter them from acquiring information.
In contrast, the high cost of information acquisition — which is borne by the seller in expectation
— decreases expected seller proceeds from the auction below the expected value of the security.
How can the preceding reasoning explain the diﬀering choice of selling mechanism for govern-
ment and corporate bonds? Industrialized country government bonds are for the most part free of
default risk, whereas corporate bonds are not. This suggests that the cost of information acquisi-
tion is lower for government bonds than it is for corporate bonds. It is consistent with the choice
of auctions for the former and PPS for the latter.
Previous comparisons of auctions and PPS can be found in both economics and ﬁnance. The
economics literature has mainly considered the case of private values.4 We believe the assumption
of common value values to be more appropriate for our analysis of ﬁnancial securities such as
bonds that are traded in secondary markets.5 The ﬁnance literature has compared common value
auctions and book-building, itself a form of PPS (Spatt and Srivastava, 1991), in the context of
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs).6 We note at this point that our explanation recalls that oﬀered by
Sherman (2001) to explain the prevalence of book-building in IPOs: PPS aﬀords the seller better
control over the amount of information acquired by investors. We return to IPOs in Section 6.7
3This result is due to French and McCormick (1984). See also Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994).
4See for example Wang (1993) and Arnold and Lippman (1995).
5Wang (1998) analyses the intermediate case of correlated private values.
6See Chemmanur and Liu (2001) and Sherman (2001).
7Madhavan (1992) compares auction and dealer markets. We believe his analysis of secondary markets not to be
entirely applicable to the the primary markets that we consider. This is because previous trading in a security makes
3We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we consider the case of second-price auctions. In Section
3, we consider that of PPS. We compare auctions and PPS in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates our
results by means of an example. We brieﬂy examine the implications of our analysis for IPOs in
Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Second-price auctions
The ﬁrst part of the present section is based on French and McCormick (1984). It is included in
order to introduce the notation and for completeness.
Consider a seller who wishes to sell a security that has unknown value V . This value has
cumulative distribution function FV (:) and probability density function fV (:) over the interval
[Vl;Vh].
There are N > 1 investors, indexed by i = 1;:::;N. Investor i can, if he so desires, acquire
information Xi at a cost c about the value of the security before entering his bid. We consider a
pure common value model, Xi = V + "i, with the error term "i independent of V and i.i.d. across
i.
We let n¤, 0 · n¤ · N, denote the number of investors who choose to incur the cost of acquiring
information. The number n¤ is also the number of bidders in the auction, because any bidder who
has not acquired information has an expected payoﬀ that is at most equal to zero (Milgrom and
Weber, 1982b). Once all n¤ bids have been entered, the security is sold to the highest bidder, at a
price equal to the second highest bid.8
By virtue of the symmetry across investors and bidders, we limit our analysis to bidder 1.9 We
drop the subscript 1 for ease of notation: X ´ X1. We let Yn¤¡1 denote the highest order statistic
of the signals X2;:::;Xn¤ received by the remaining n¤ ¡ 1 bidders.
Following Milgrom and Weber (1982b), we deﬁne vn¤¡1 (x;y) ´ E [V jX = x;Yn¤¡1 = y]. Bid-
der 1 forms the expectation vn¤¡1 (x;y) of the value of the security on receiving the information
the cost of acquiring information about the security – a central component of our analysis – much lower for secondary
markets than for primary markets.
8The assumption of second-price auction is without loss of generality for the general results of Sections 2, 3, and
4. It is made because i) it corresponds to the uniform-price auctions used to sell government bonds and ii) it permits
the use of the closed-form solution for bidder proﬁts computed by Kagel, Levin and Harstad’s (1995) in the example
of Section 5.
9Milgrom (1981) shows the existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Harstad (1991) shows that the
symmetric equilibrium is the only locally nondegenerate risk neutral Nash equilibrium in increasing bid strategies if
there are more than 3 bidders. (An equilibrium is locally nondegenerate when the probability of any given bidder
winning the auction is positive for all bidders.) See also Kagel et al. (1995).
4X = x and on presuming the highest order statistic amongst the remaining signals is Yn¤¡1 = y.
We know from Milgrom and Weber (1982b) that bidder 1 bids10
vn¤¡1 (x;x) = E [V jX = x;Yn¤¡1 = x]: (1)
Intuitively, bidder 1 adjusts his estimate of the value of the security for the fact that he wins the
auction when he receives the highest signal amongst the n¤ signals X1;:::;Xn¤. His presumption
that the second highest signal is equal to the highest signal – which he has received – ensures that
he does not lose the auction to a bidder who has received a lower signal than he has. Bidder 1 is
induced to bid truthfully because the second price auction implies that his bid aﬀects his probability
of winning the auction but not the price he pays upon winning.
Symmetry across bidders implies that the seller’s expected proceeds equal
Πn¤ = E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1]; (2)
and that a bidder’s expected proﬁt – gross of the cost of acquiring information – equals
¼n¤ =
1
n¤ (E [V ] ¡ E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1]): (3)
Free entry in turn implies that n¤ is such that ¼n¤ = c. Combining, we can rewrite the seller’s
expected proceeds as Πn¤ = E [V ] ¡ n¤c. As noted in the introduction, the combined cost of
information acquisition is borne by the seller and determines the extent of underpricing. This
result was ﬁrst derived by French and McCormick (1984).
We now wish to examine the comparative statics of Πn¤ with respect to the cost of acquiring
information c, the quality of the information that can be obtained about the value of the security,
and the riskiness of the security. For that purpose, we must ﬁrst determine the variation of a
bidder’s expected proﬁt as a function of the number of bidders, @¼n¤=@n¤.
There is no general result concerning
@¼n¤
@n¤ = ¡
¼n¤
n¤ ¡
1
n¤
@E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1]
@n¤ : (4)
This is because @E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1]=@n¤ cannot be signed. On the one hand,
a larger number of bidders increases Yn¤¡1, the maximum of the signals received by the now larger
number of bidders other than bidder 1. A higher signal Yn¤¡1 implies a higher estimate of the value
of the security, vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1). On the other hand, a larger number of bidders decreases the
estimate of the value of the security vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1) for a given signal Yn¤¡1. This is because
10Levin and Harstad (1986) show that this function is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
5a larger number of bidders necessitates a greater downward adjustment for the winner’s curse on
the part of the winner of the auction.
Milgrom (1981) has shown that @E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1]=@n¤ > 0 as n¤ becomes
large. We assume in what follows that the preceding inequality holds true over the range of n¤ that
we shall encounter.
We represent a decrease in the quality of the information by a garbling Ξ of the information
Xi, with E [ΞjV ] = E [Ξj"i] = 0. The information available to a bidder who has incurred the cost
c is now X0
i ´ Xi + Ξ. The corresponding highest order statistic is Y 0
n¤¡1 = Yn¤¡1 + Ξ. We note
that the garbling Ξ is identical across bidders. It can be viewed as some bidder-wide decrease in
the informativeness of the signals that investors can acquire.
The nature of X0 as a garbling of X and of Y 0
n¤¡1 as a garbling of Yn¤¡1 implies that
wn¤¡1
¡
x;y;x0;y0¢
´ E
£
V
¯ ¯X = x;Yn¤¡1 = y;X0 = x0;Y 0
n¤¡1 = y0¤
= E [V jX = x;Yn¤¡1 = y]
= vn¤¡1 (x;y): (5)
We can now use the well known result that expected proceeds increase in the information
available to bidders (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b) to write
E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1] = E
£
wn¤¡1
¡
Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1;Y 0
n¤¡1;Y 0
n¤¡1
¢
jX > Yn¤¡1
¤
= E
£
wn¤¡1
¡
Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1;Y 0
n¤¡1;Y 0
n¤¡1
¢¯ ¯X0 > Y 0
n¤¡1
¤
¸ E
£
vn¤¡1
¡
Y 0
n¤¡1;Y 0
n¤¡1
¢¯ ¯X0 > Y 0
n¤¡1
¤
: (6)
The ﬁrst equality is obtained by equation (5), the second by noting that
X0 > Y 0
n¤¡1 () X + Ξ > Yn¤¡1 + Ξ () X > Yn¤¡1; (7)
and the third by the result that expected proceeds increase in the information available to bidders.
The lower expected seller proceeds for a given number of bidders n¤ imply a higher proﬁt per
bidder, and induce a higher number of bidders n¤0 to enter the auction. We therefore have n¤0 > n¤
and Πn¤0 = E [V ]¡n¤0c < Πn¤. Thus, the lower the quality of the information that can be obtained
about the value of the security, the larger the number of bidders participating in the auction and
the lower the seller’s expected proceeds.
We now consider the change in expected proceeds that results from a change in the riskiness of
the security. We represent an increase in riskiness by a mean-preserving spread Ψ applied to the
value V of the security, with E [ΨjV ] = 0. We deﬁne V 00 ´ V + Ψ and have corresponding signal
X00
i = V 00 + "i = Xi + Ψ and highest order statistic Y 00
n¤¡1 = Yn¤¡1 + Ψ.
6We ﬁrst note that
vn¤¡1 (x;y) = E [V jX = x;Yn¤¡1 = y]
= E
£
V
¯ ¯X00 = x + Ã;Y 00
n¤¡1 = y + Ã;Ψ = Ã
¤
= E
£
V 00 ¡ Ψ
¯ ¯X00 = x + Ã;Y 00
n¤¡1 = y + Ã;Ψ = Ã
¤
= E
£
V 00 ¯
¯X00 = x + Ã;Y 00
n¤¡1 = y + Ã;Ψ = Ã
¤
¡ Ã
´ wn¤¡1 (x + Ã;y + Ã;Ã) ¡ Ã:
We can now write
E [vn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1;Yn¤¡1)jX > Yn¤¡1] = E [wn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1 + Ψ;Yn¤¡1 + Ψ;Ψ) ¡ ΨjX > Yn¤¡1]
= E [wn¤¡1 (Yn¤¡1 + Ψ;Yn¤¡1 + Ψ;Ψ) ¡ ΨjX + Ψ > Yn¤¡1 + Ψ]
= E
£
wn¤¡1
¡
Y 00
n¤¡1;Y 00
n¤¡1;Ψ
¢
¡ Ψ
¯ ¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
= E
£
wn¤¡1
¡
Y 00
n¤¡1;Y 00
n¤¡1;Ψ
¢¯
¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
¡E
£
Ψ
¯ ¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
= E
£
wn¤¡1
¡
Y 00
n¤¡1;Y 00
n¤¡1;Ψ
¢¯
¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
¡E
£
E [ΨjV ]
¯ ¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
¸ E
£
v00
n¤¡1
¡
Y 00
n¤¡1;Y 00
n¤¡1
¢¯ ¯X00 > Y 00
n¤¡1
¤
: (8)
where v00
n¤¡1 (x00;y00) ´ E
£
V 00 ¯ ¯X00 = x00;Y 00
n¤¡1 = y00¤
. Inequality (8) is established in a manner
similar to that used to establish inequality (6), using the result that expected proceeds increase in
the information available to bidders. As for the case of a decrease in the quality of the information,
an increase in the riskiness of the security increases the number of bidders entering the auction
from n¤ to n¤00 and decreases expected seller proceeds to Πn¤00 = E [V ] ¡ n¤00c.11
We now consider the change in expected seller proceeds that results from an increase in the cost
of acquiring information, c. Clearly, an increase in c decreases the number of bidders. Whether the
product n¤c increases or decreases in c depends on the elasticity of n¤ with respect to c. Expected
seller proceeds decrease in c when the elasticity is greater than 1, and increase when it is less than
1.
To summarize, the seller’s proceeds from the auction increase with the quality of the information
available to bidders, decrease with the riskiness of the security, and depend ambiguously on the
information acquisition cost, c.
11That expected proceeds increase in the information available to bidders is central to the derivation of inequalities
(6) and (8) above. The intuition is that the higher the quality of the information available to bidders, the more
similar bidders’ assessement of the value of the security, the closer therefore the second highest bid to the highest bid
and the higher expected proceeds. The two derivations diﬀer in that the eﬀect of information quality is direct in (6)
whereas it is indirect in (8). In the latter case, the greater volatility makes the value of the security more diﬃcult to
estimate. This diﬀerence explains why the derivation of (8) is somewhat more involved than that of (6).
73 Posted-price selling
We now consider the case where the seller sells the security using PPS. We consider only posted-
price schemes that deter investors from acquiring information. This is because posted-price schemes
that fail to deter investors from acquiring information are likely to be dominated by auctions.12
How can the seller preclude the acquisition of information? The solution is to post a price
P < E [V ] that is such as to leave each of the N investors indiﬀerent between i) incurring the
cost of acquiring information and exploiting the informational advantage thereby obtained, and ii)
refraining from acquiring information, taking part in the sale, and obtaining the discount E [V ]¡P
if allocated the security. Formally, P is such that
E [max[E [V jXi] ¡ P;0]]
N
¡ c =
E [V ] ¡ P
N
: (9)
Rewriting,
c =
E[max[E [V jXi] ¡ P;0]]
N
¡
E [E [V jXi] ¡ P]
N
=
1
N
E [max[P ¡ E [V jXi];0]]: (10)
Equation (10) indicates that the price P must be such that the expected loss from buying an
overvalued security is equal to the cost of acquiring information that would serve to guard against
doing so. Note that the expected loss reﬂects the 1=N probability of being allocated the security
when no other potential buyer acquires information.
We ﬁrst note that (10) implies that @P=@c > 0. This is simply a consequence of the fact that
a lower discount needs be oﬀered investors to deter them from acquiring more costly information.
In the case where information is costless, the acquisition of information can be prevented only by
12That posted-price schemes that fail to deter investors from acquiring information are likely to be dominated by
auctions is suggested by the results of Harstad (1990) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996). Harstad (1990) shows that
entry costs are borne by the seller in expectation. (Although he considers only auctions, his results can easily be
extended to PPS.) This implies that expected seller proceeds are higher with an auction when the auction induces less
entry than does PPS, that is when n
¤ · n
PPS, where n
PPS denotes the number of investors who acquire information
under PPS. (Note that under PPS with information acquisition as with an auction, investors who do not acquire
information do not participate.) When n
¤ > n
PPS, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that expected seller proceeds
are higher with an ascending auction with n
¤ bidders than with PPS with n
PPS < n
¤ bidders. This is because the
greater competition that results from the presence of one or more additional bidders in the auction is more valuable to
the seller than the increased bargaining power that comes from the posting of a price, which is equivalent to making
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. We note that the results of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) are only suggestive in our case,
because we consider a second-price rather than an ascending auction.
8setting a price P = Vl.13 This is because information has value for all prices above Vl in such case.
We then consider the eﬀect of a garbling of the information that investors can acquire. As in
Section 2, we denote X0
i the garbled information. We know from Blackwell (1953) and Blackwell
and Girshick (1954) that if X0
i is a garbling of Xi, then E [V jXi] is a mean-preserving spread
of E [V jX0
i]. This is because the higher the quality of the information, the more distinguishable
the conditional expectation from the unconditional expectation, and therefore the more diﬀuse the
distribution of the conditional expectation. As the LHS of equation (10) is convex in the conditional
expectation and increasing in the price posted, we have P · P0, where P0 denotes the price that
deters investors from acquiring the garbled information X0. In words, a higher discount must be
oﬀered investors to deter them from acquiring higher quality information.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of a change in the riskiness of the security. As in Section 2,
we represent an increase in riskiness by a mean-preserving spread Ψ applied to the value V of the
security, with E [ΨjV ] = 0. We have V 00 = V +Ψ and corresponding signal X00
i = V 00+"i = Xi+Ψ.
We ﬁrst note that
E
£
V 00 jXi
¤
= E [V + ΨjXi] = E [V jXi].
We then note that X00
i = V 00 + "i constitutes higher quality information about V 00 than does
Xi = V 00 ¡ Ψ + "i.14 From Blackwell (1953) and Blackwell and Girshick (1954), this implies that
E [V 00 jX00
i ] has a more diﬀuse distribution than does E [V 00 jXi].
We can now write
E
£
max
£
P00 ¡ E
£
V 00 ¯ ¯X00
i
¤
;0
¤¤
= Nc
= E [max[P ¡ E [V jXi];0]]
= E
£
max
£
P ¡ E
£
V 00 jXi
¤
;0
¤¤
· E
£
max
£
P ¡ E
£
V 00 ¯
¯X00
i
¤
;0
¤¤
: (11)
where P00 denotes the price that deters investors from acquiring information when the security
has value V 00. Inequality (11) implies that P00 · P. In words, a higher discount must be oﬀered
investors to deter them from acquiring information about a more risky security.
13To show this formally, let z ´ E(V jXi) and denote H(z) the prior distribution of z. Condition (10) becomes
c =
1
N
Z P
Vl
(P ¡ z)dH(z):
The seller must set P = Vl for this condition to hold when c = 0.
14Note that what may loosely be referred to as the ‘signal-to-noise ratio’ is larger for X
00
i than it is for Xi,
var[V
00]
var["i]
>
var[V
00]
var[Ψ] + var["i]
:
9To summarize, the posted price that ensures that no buyer wishes to acquire information – and
therefore the seller’s revenue – is increasing in the information acquisition cost, and decreasing in
the quality of the information available to bidders and in the riskiness of the security.
4 Auctions and posted-price selling compared
We are now in a position to compare auctions and PPS. We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of the cost of
acquiring information, c.
As noted in the introduction, auctions can be expected to dominate PPS for small c. In the
limit, when c is zero, all investors enter the auction. The larger the number of investors N, the
closer expected seller proceeds are to the expected value of the security E [V ] (Milgrom, 1981). In
contrast, only a price P equal to lowest value of the security Vl can deter investors from acquiring
information when information is costless.
We now turn to the case of large c. In particular, we consider a cost ch that is such that equation
(9) holds even with P = E [V ]. Formally,
ch ´
E [max[E [V jXi] ¡ E [V ];0]]
N
: (12)
It is clear that no investor has any incentive to acquire information in such case, despite the fact
that no discount is oﬀered. This is because the cost of acquiring information is suﬃciently high to
deter the acquisition of information without the need for a discount. The seller’s proceeds therefore
equal E [V ].
Would expected seller proceeds in an auction also equal E [V ]? We show by contradiction
that the answer is in the negative. Suppose the equilibrium is one in which no investor acquires
information and all N investors bid E [V ] and have expected payoﬀ zero. Consider investor i who
contemplates deviating from that equilibrium. His expected payoﬀ from acquiring information at a
cost ch – and bidding more than E [V ] if the information Xi he obtains is such that E [V jXi] > E [V ]
– is15
E [max[E [V jXi] ¡ E [V ];0]] ¡ ch =
N ¡ 1
N
E [max[E [V jXi] ¡ E [V ];0]] > 0; (13)
Investor i therefore has an incentive to acquire information. This induces some investors other
than i to acquire information and other investors to withdraw from the auction. It reduces the
auction to the one examined in Section 2, with expected seller proceeds E [V ] ¡ n¤ch < E [V ].16
We therefore conclude that PPS dominates auctions for relatively large c.
15Note that the price paid by bidder i in a second-price auction is E [V ], as this is the bid made by the other
bidders under the equilibrium considered.
16If ch is such that only a single investor enters the auction, expected seller proceeds equal Vl < E [V ].
10Why is the cost ch suﬃcient to deter information acquisition under PPS but not in an auction?
Comparing (12) and (13), we note that what makes the former an equality and the latter an
inequality is the factor 1=N in the former. This factor represents the probability of being allocated
the security under PPS. Thus, an investor who acquires information that reveals the security to
be underpriced (E [V jXi] > E [V ]) is constrained in his ability to proﬁt from this information by
the fact that he has only a 1=N probability of being allocated the security under PPS. No such
constraint exists in an auction, for the investor can ensure that he receives the security with certainty
by bidding more than E [V ]. In words, the additional degree of freedom conferred investors in an
auction – the choice of the bid – and the fact that the security is allocated to the highest bidder
increase investors’ ability to proﬁt from the information they may acquire and therefore increases
the cost necessary to deter them from acquiring information.
The preceding discussion can help us answer the question that motivates this paper, speciﬁcally
why government bonds are sold by auction and corporate bonds by PPS. To the extent that
corporate bonds present credit risk but government bonds do not, the cost of acquiring information
should be relatively low for government bonds and relatively high for corporate bonds. In line with
the analysis above, the former should be sold by auction and the latter by PPS. What is more,
corporate bonds should be sold at a discount. Both predictions appear to be borne out by the
evidence: primary debt issues are sold by PPS, and they are underpriced on average.17
The fact that many emerging country government bonds are sold by PPS is in line with our anal-
ysis. Emerging country government bonds can present substantial credit risk. They are therefore
more in the nature of corporate bonds than of government bonds.
We now consider the eﬀect of the quality of information.18 The analysis above shows that
an improvement in the quality of information leads to an increase in revenues with the auction,
but to larger underpricing under PPS. Therefore, an improvement in the quality of information
should favor auctions over PPS. Supporting this view are developments related to the internet.
The internet can be argued to have made possible a dramatic improvement in the quality of the
information available to market participants. It is credited with having occasioned “an enormous
change in the opportunities for the use of auctions” (Pinker et al., 2001, p. 3), as evidenced for
example by the profusion of B2B exchanges that use auctions or the introduction of the OpenIPO
auction mechanism by W.R. Hambrecht+Co.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of the riskiness of the security. We know from the analyses of
17Smith (1999) reports the results of three studies, which ﬁnd underpricing of primary debt issues to range from
5bp (Weinstein, 1978), through 50 bp (Sorensen, 1982), to 160bp (Smith, 1986). See also Ederington (1974) and
Wasserfallen and Wydler (1988).
18The quality of information is of course not unrelated to its cost, as higher quality information can generally be
obtained at higher cost. Nonetheless, they are not perfect substitutes.
11Sections 2 and 3 that an increase in riskiness decreases both expected seller proceeds in an auction
and the price posted under PPS. It is therefore not clear how riskiness aﬀects the choice between
auctions and PPS. That greater riskiness favors auctions is suggested by the change from PPS to
auctions for the sale of long-term government bonds that took place in the 1960s. Prior to that
time, long-term government bonds had been sold by PPS (Goldstein, 1962). After a number of
experiments with the use of auctions in the early part of the decade (Berney, 1964), the US and
Canadian governments ﬁnally adopted auctions later in the decade. We note that the eventual
adoption of auctions was more or less contemporaneous with the more volatile economic conditions
of the late 1960s, and that such conditions must have led to an increase in the volatility of long-term
government bonds.
5 An Example
In order to gain some insight into the properties of posted prices and auctions, let us consider an
example. Suppose that the prior distribution of the value of the security is uniform on the interval
[Vl;Vh] and that a bidder observes a signal X that is uniformly distributed around the true value
V ,
X = V + "; " 2 [¡²;²]: (14)
We wish to determine how the choice between the auction and the posted-price scheme depend on
the riskiness of the security, Vh ¡Vl, the dispersion of the signal, ², and the information acquisition
cost, c.
5.1 The posted-price scheme
Consider ﬁrst the posted-price scheme. To compute the seller’s expected payoﬀ, we need to compute
E[V jX] and the distribution of X. Assume that Vl + ² < Vh ¡ ² (analogous computations can be
performed for the other case as well). Then, since X is the sum of two uniformly distributed
random variables, it has a trapezoidal distribution with density function19
19This can be shown as follows. Recall that the density of x is given by the convolution
fX(x) =
Z 1
¡1
fV (x ¡ ")f"(")d":
Note that f"(") = 1=(2²) on [¡²;²] and 0 elsewhere. Hence,
fX(x) =
Z ²
¡²
fV (x ¡ ")
1
2²
d":
Now, fV (x ¡ ") = 1=(Vh ¡ Vl) if Vl · x ¡ " · Vh and 0 elsewhere. This condition, which can be written as
x ¡ Vh · " · x ¡ Vl, constrains the range of " over which fV is nonzero. Three cases can be distinguished. If
12fX(x) =
8
> > <
> > :
x+²¡Vl
2²(Vh¡Vl); Vl ¡ ² · x · Vl + ²
1
Vh¡Vl; Vl + ² · x · Vh ¡ ²
Vh+²¡x
2²(Vh¡Vl); Vh ¡ ² · x · Vh + ²
(15)
Conditional on observing the signal X, the expected value of the security is given by20
E[V jX] =
8
> > <
> > :
Vl+X+²
2 ; Vl ¡ ² · X · Vl + ²
X; Vl + ² · X · Vh ¡ ²
Vh+X¡²
2 ; Vh ¡ ² · X · Vh + ²
(16)
To determine the magnitude of the discount required to deter information acquisition by buyers,
we need to compute E[max[P ¡ E(V jX);0]]. For P · Vl + ², we have
E[max[P ¡ E[V jX];0]] =
Z 2P¡Vl¡²
Vl¡²
µ
P ¡
X + ² + Vl
2
¶
X + ² ¡ Vl
2²(Vh ¡ Vl)
dX =
(P ¡ Vl)3
3²(Vh ¡ Vl)
(17)
x ¡ Vl · ² (i.e., for x 2 [Vl ¡ ²;Vl + ²]), one has
fX(x) =
Z x¡Vl
¡²
1
Vh ¡ Vl
1
2²
d" =
x + ² ¡ Vl
2²(Vh ¡ Vl)
:
If x ¡ Vh ¸ ¡² (i.e., for x 2 [Vh ¡ ²;Vh + ²]), one has
fX(x) =
Z ²
x¡Vh
1
Vh ¡ Vl
1
2²
d" =
Vh + ² ¡ x
2²(Vh ¡ Vl)
:
Finally, if x ¡ Vl ¸ ² and ¡² · x ¡ Vh (i.e., for x 2 [Vl + ²;Vh ¡ ²]), one has
fX(x) =
Z ²
¡²
1
Vh ¡ Vl
1
2²
d" =
1
Vh ¡ Vl
:
20Note that using Bayes’ rule,
E[V jX] =
R 1
¡1 V fX(XjV )fV (V )dV
R 1
¡1 fX(XjV )fV (V )dV
:
Using the fact that fX(xjV ) = 1=(2²) on [V ¡²;V +²] and fV (V ) = 1=(Vh ¡Vl) on [Vl;Vh] and 0 elsewhere, one can
again distinguish three cases. If Vl + ² · X · Vh ¡ ², one has
E[V jX] =
R X+²
X¡² V
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
R X+²
X¡²
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
=
V 2
2
￿
￿X+²
X¡²
V
￿
￿X+²
X¡²
= X:
If X < Vl + ², one has
E[V jX] =
R X+²
Vl V
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
R X+²
Vl
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
=
V 2
2
￿
￿X+²
Vl
V
￿
￿X+²
Vl
=
X + ² + Vl
2
:
Finally, if X > Vh ¡ ², one has
E[V jX] =
R Vh
X¡² V
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
R Vh
X¡²
1
2²
1
Vh¡VldV
=
V 2
2
￿
￿Vh
X¡²
V
￿
￿Vh
X¡²
=
Vh + X ¡ ²
2
:
13and for Vl + ² · P · (Vh + Vl)=2,
E[max[P ¡ E[V jX];0]] =
Z Vl+²
Vl¡²
µ
P ¡
X + ² + Vl
2
¶
X + ² ¡ Vl
2²(Vh ¡ Vl)
dX +
Z P
Vl+²
P ¡ X
Vh ¡ Vl
dX
=
3(P ¡ Vl)2 ¡ ²2
6(Vh ¡ Vl)
(18)
Solving the no information acquisition condition E[max[P ¡ E[V jX];0]] = Nc for P then yields
P =
(
Vl +
3 p
3Nc²(Vh ¡ Vl); P · Vl + ²
Vl +
p
2Nc(Vh ¡ Vl) + ²2=3; Vl + ² · P · (Vh + Vl)=2
(19)
Note that when c · ˜ c ´ ²2=(3N(Vh¡Vl)), P · Vl+² and the ﬁrst expression for P applies, whereas
when c ¸ ˜ c, the second does. Summarizing, the posted-price schedule is given by
P =
(
Vl +
3 p
3Nc²(Vh ¡ Vl); c · ²2
3N(Vh¡Vl)
Vl +
p
2Nc(Vh ¡ Vl) + ²2=3; c ¸ ²2
3N(Vh¡Vl)
(20)
Let us consider its properties. Note ﬁrst that for c = 0, one has P = Vl, conﬁrming the result that
unless the posted price is set at the lower bound of the value distribution, buyers always choose
to become informed if doing so is costless. Second, observe that @P=@c > 0 for all c: a higher
information acquisition cost makes a smaller discount necessary to deter information acquisition.
Third, @P=@² > 0: when the signal becomes less precise, a lower discount is required to prevent
information acquisition. Finally, note that @P=@(Vh ¡ Vl) < 0: a higher discount must be given to
buyers in order to deter them from acquiring information about a more risky security. All these
eﬀects conﬁrm the results of the general model of Section 3.
The information acquisition cost ch such that information acquisition can be prevented without
giving buyers a discount can be obtained as the solution to
P = Vl +
r
2Nch(Vh ¡ Vl) +
²2
3
=
Vh + Vl
2
(21)
and is therefore given by
ch =
Vh ¡ Vl
8N
¡
²2
6N(Vh ¡ Vl)
(22)
Note that this amount increases both when the security becomes more risky (Vh ¡ Vl rises) and
when the precision of the signal increases (² falls).
Figure 1 pictures the posted price (upper panel) and the corresponding discount (Vh+Vl)=2¡P
(lower panel) as a function of the information acquisition cost c for N = 10 potential buyers, Vl = 0,
Vh = 1 and two degrees of signal precision: ² = 0:1 (solid line) and ² = 0:2 (dashed line). Note ﬁrst
that for all values of the information acquisition cost, P is higher for ² = 0:2 than for ² = 0:1. Also,
observe that in both cases, underpricing diminishes rapidly as the information acquisition cost c is
140 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Information Acquisition Cost c
P
o
s
t
e
d
 
P
r
i
c
e
epsilon = 0.1
epsilon = 0.2
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Information Acquisition Cost c
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
epsilon = 0.1
epsilon = 0.2
Figure 1: Posted price and discount as a function of the information
acquisition cost c.
increased. For a value of c exceeding ch (about 0:012 in both cases although, consistent with the
general analysis, ch is lower when the signal dispersion is higher), no discount is required to deter
information acquisition and the item can be sold at its unconditional expected value (Vh + Vl)=2
using the posted-price scheme.
5.2 The auction
Kagel et al. (1995) show that in the setting considered here, the expected gross proﬁt per bidder
when n bidders participate in the auction is given by
¼n = 2²
n ¡ 1
n(n + 1)
: (23)
Hence, for an information acquisition cost c, the number of bidders that choose to enter the auction
is given by the lowest of the total number of potential buyers N and the integer part of
n¤ =
2² ¡ c +
p
c2 ¡ 12c² + 4²2
2c
: (24)
When n¤ > N, all N potential buyers acquire information, enter the auction and make a positive
expected net proﬁt of
¼N ¡ c = 2²
N ¡ 1
N(N + 1)
¡ c (25)
15When n¤ · N, only some bidders enter the auction and — ignoring the integer constraint — make
an expected proﬁt of 0.
As a result, underpricing in the auction is given by
N¼N = 2²
N ¡ 1
N + 1
; n¤ ¸ N;
n¤¼n¤ = n¤c =
2² ¡ c +
p
c2 ¡ 12c² + 4²2
2
; n¤ < N: (26)
Note ﬁrst that underpricing tends to 0 as the signal dispersion ² tends to 0 and that underpricing
increases with ²,
@(N¼N)
@²
= 2
N ¡ 1
N + 1
> 0;
@(n¤c)
@²
= 1 +
2² ¡ 3c
p
c2 ¡ 12c² + 4²2 > 0: (27)
Thus, the noisier the signal, the lower the seller’s proceeds from the auction, in stark contrast to
the posted-price scheme, where a noisier signal raises the seller’s revenue.
Note also that for the range of c over which all N bidders enter the auction, underpricing is
independent of c and given by N¼N = 2²(N ¡ 1)=(N + 1). On the other hand, in this particular
case, over the range of c such that n¤ < N, underpricing is decreasing in the information acquisition
cost c, since
@(n¤c)
@c
=
1
2
µ
c ¡ 6²
p
c2 ¡ 12c² + 4²2 ¡ 1
¶
< 0: (28)
This is because the number of bidders n¤ participating in the auction reacts elastically to the
information acquisition cost.
These eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 2, which is based on the same parameter values as Figure
1. The upper panel depicts the number of bidders, the lower panel the expected revenue from the
auction. When the signal is relatively precise (² = 0:1, solid line), all N = 10 potential buyers
acquire information and participate in the auction when c is less than 0.016. Over this range,
underpricing is given by 2²(N ¡ 1)=(N + 1) = 0:164. When c rises above 0.016, the number of
bidders falls below 10 suﬃciently quickly that the expected revenue from the auction increases with
c. On the other hand, when the signal is relatively noisy (² = 0:2, dashed line), all 10 bidders
participate in the auction over the range of values of c considered and underpricing is constant at
2²(N ¡ 1)=(N + 1) = 0:327.
These results suggest that the seller may want to charge an entry fee in order to reduce the
number of bidders participating in the auction and therefore aggregate underpricing. This is par-
ticularly true when c is low and bidders’ expected proﬁt — net of the information acquisition cost
— is positive. Paralleling the arguments in French and McCormick (1984), the best the seller can
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Figure 2: Number of bidders and expected revenue from the auction as
a function of the information acquisition cost c.
do is to constrain the number of entrants to 2 bidders. He can do this by setting an entry fee k
such that
¼n = 2²
n ¡ 1
n(n + 1)
= c + k (29)
is satisﬁed for n = 2. Solving, the optimal entry fee is given by
k =
²
3
¡ c: (30)
Note that the optimal entry fee is increasing in signal dispersion, reﬂecting the fact that bidders’
expected gross proﬁt and therefore their incentive to enter the auction is increasing in signal dis-
persion.
Although the entry fee allows the seller to constrain the number of bidders participating in the
auction, it is not able to deter them from acquiring information. Interestingly, since the optimal
entry fee eliminates the impact of signal dispersion on bidders’ incentives to enter the auction,
the seller’s expected revenue with entry fees becomes independent of signal dispersion and equals
E[V ] ¡ 2c = (Vh + Vl)=2 ¡ 2c.
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Figure 3: Expected revenue from the auction and the posted price
scheme as a function of the information acquisition cost c.
5.3 The posted-price scheme and the auction compared
Figure 3 compares the revenue from the posted-price scheme and the auction for the situation
considered above when there are no entry fees. The upper panel considers the case of low signal
dispersion (² = 0:1), the lower panel that of high signal dispersion (² = 0:2). Note that in both
cases, the auction is preferred when the information acquisition cost is low, and the posted-price
scheme when it is high. In the case where signal dispersion is relatively low (upper panel), bidders’
expected proﬁts and the number of bidders that enter the auction are not very large, and the
auction is preferred to the posted price scheme for values of c between 0 and 0.005. In contrast,
when signal dispersion is relatively high (lower panel), bidders’ expected proﬁts and the number
of bidders entering the auction – and therefore underpricing in the auction – are larger, and the
posted price scheme is preferred for virtually all values of the information acquisition cost c. Note
also that in the particular case considered here, since the riskiness of the security Vh ¡ Vl has no
eﬀect on the proﬁt from the auction and reduces the optimal posted price, it favors the auction.
Figure 4 performs the same comparison when the seller uses entry fees to reduce the number
of participating bidders. Recall that in this case, the auction’s expected revenue is E[V ] ¡ 2c
and does not depend on the signal’s dispersion. The seller’s revenue from using the auction again
exceeds that from the posted price when the information acquisition cost is low. For values of c
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Figure 4: Expected revenue from the auction and the posted price
scheme as a function of the information acquisition cost c when entry
fees are used.
exceeding about 0.011, however, the posted price is preferred. Furthermore, consistent with our
earlier analysis, the range of values of c over which the posted price is preferred to the auction
is larger, the greater the dispersion of the signal. Thus, just as in the case without fees, a lower
signal quality favors the posted price over the auction, and a higher riskiness of the security has
the opposite eﬀect.
6 Implications for initial public oﬀerings
We now brieﬂy turn our attention from bonds to shares. An implication of the preceding analysis is
that shares should be sold by PPS. This is because the cost of acquiring information about stocks
should be higher than it is for bonds, and the quality of the information obtained lower.21 Indeed,
in her study of IPOs in 44 countries, Sherman (2001, Table 1) ﬁnds that auctions are used in only
5 countries.22 PPS, either alone in the form of a ﬁxed-price oﬀering, or preceded by “pre-play
communication” in the form of book-building (Spatt and Srivastava, 1991), clearly dominates. As
21The greater diﬃculty of valuing stocks as compared to bonds forms the basis of the Pecking Order Theory of
capital structure (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984).
22This ﬁgure can possibly be extended to 7 countries, as Sherman (2001) is uncertain about the use of auctions in
2 countries.
19noted in the introduction, Sherman (2001) has preceded us in ascribing the beneﬁts of PPS to the
better control it aﬀords the seller over the amount of information acquired by investors. However,
as Sherman (2001, footnote 5) has recognized, entry fees into an auction for shares can achieve
much of the control over the acquisition of information that she deems necessary. What entry fees
into an auction cannot achieve — but PPS can — is the prevention of information acquisition that
constitutes the focus of our paper.
An objection to the use of PPS in IPOs is that underpricing appears to be greater with book-
building than with auctions (Derrien and Womack, 2002; Kaneko and Pettway, 2001). We note,
however, that a reasoning such as ours makes no predictions as to how average underpricing relates
to the choice of selling scheme. Instead, it suggests that the selling scheme chosen will be that
which minimizes underpricing for given values of the cost of acquiring information, the quality
of the information acquired, and the riskiness of the security. It therefore cautions against the
adoption of a selling scheme used in one setting in another setting.
To illustrate this last point, consider the case of IPOs in Israel.23 Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl
(1999) report that in Israel, where the use of auctions for IPOs is prevalent, average underpricing
is 4.5%, about a third of the ﬁgure for the United States. Does this suggest that auctions should
be used in other IPO markets, such as the United States?
Not if we consider the following. The average elasticity of demand estimated by Kandel et al.
(1999) is 37.1, far above the ﬁgures reported for the United States. For example, in her analysis
of 31 Dutch auction share repurchases, Bagwell (1992) estimates an average elasticity of 0.68.24
As noted by Kandel et al. (1999), the very high elasticity they estimate indicates that bidders
have very similar assessments of the value of the securities sold in the IPO. Combined with the
large average number of orders (4,077, Table 1, Kandel et al., 1999), this suggests that the cost of
information acquisition, c, is very low in Israel, and the quality of the information acquired very
high. We are unable to explain why that should be the case. However, we can conclude from the
result that seller proceeds in a common value auction are increasing in the homogeneity of bidders’
information that an attempt to use auctions in a country such as the United States where the low
elasticity of demand suggests that bidders have heterogeneous information would likely result in
markedly higher underpricing than is observed in Israel.25
23A somewhat analogous point is made by Kutsuna and Smith (2001) for Japan.
24See also Loderer, Cooney, and Van Drunen (1991), Hodrick (1999), and Kaul, Mehrotra, and Mørck (2000).
25The low elasticity in the United States can partly be ascribed to tax rather than information considerations.
However, the estimate by Loderer et al. (1991) of an average elasticity of 11 attributable exclusively to tax consider-
ations suggests that taxes alone are unlikely to account for the entire diﬀerence between Bagwell’s (1992) estimates
and those of Kandel et al. (1999).
207 Conclusion
We believe a general lesson can be drawn from our analysis. It is that i) the strength with which
the price and allocation prescribed by a selling scheme react to investors’ bids and ii) investors’
incentives to acquire information are forms of strategic complements.26 The allocation reacts very
weakly and the price not at all to investors’ bids under PPS, but much more strongly in an auction.27
This makes investors’ incentives to acquire information much greater in auctions than under PPS,
to the point that only those investors who have acquired information will enter a bid in an auction.
In contrast, the price posted by the seller under PPS can be set in such way as to deny investors
any incentive to acquire information.
Our comparison of auctions and PPS can be viewed as extending Persico’s (2000) comparison
of ﬁrst- and second-price auctions. As discussed by Chari and Weber (1992) and shown formally
by Persico (2000), the incentives to acquire information are lower in second-price auctions than in
their ﬁrst-price counterparts. In a ﬁrst-price auction, it is valuable to bid close to one’s opponents
to minimize the price paid upon winning. Information helps in making such bids. No such concern
arises in a second-price auction, because the price paid by the winner does not depend on the
bid he has entered. Our analysis demonstrates that PPS gives investors even lower incentives to
acquire information than do second-price auctions. Indeed, PPS can be used fully to deter them
from acquiring information.
Our analysis is also related to the work of Parlour and Rajan (2002). They analyze an auction
with a rationing scheme in which the winning bidder is chosen randomly among the K highest
bidders and the price paid by the winning bidder is set at the K +1th highest bid. They show that
rationing with K = N ¡1 is optimal when bidders have low quality information. This eﬀect arises
because rationing mitigates the winner’s curse. Their result recalls our result that PPS dominates
auctions when the information investors may acquire is of low quality, because PPS can be viewed
as rationing among all N bidders. In such case, the sale price must of course be set by the seller,
for buyers would otherwise bid only the lowest value for the item being sold.
Throughout, we have assumed that the decision to acquire information was an ‘all-or-nothing’
decision: information either was acquired in its entirety, or it was not acquired at all. This is not
likely to be the case in practice. Instead, some information may be acquired at such a low cost that
the seller will not wish to preclude its acquisition. Other information may be suﬃciently costly
to acquire that the seller will be able to preclude its acquisition at the cost of a relatively small
discount.
26See Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) for an analysis of strategic substitutes and complements.
27Under PPS, the allocation depends only on investors’ decision whether to place a bid, but not on the amount
bid.
21Does the presence of these two sorts of information invalidate our analysis? We believe the
answer is in the negative. We conjecture that the need for PPS intended to preclude the acquisition
of the second sort of information will remain, but that PPS will be combined with screening or pre-
play communication intended to induce investors to reveal truthfully the ﬁrst sort of information.
We believe IPOs are a case in point. Investors in an IPO may acquire information about
the general state of demand for the security simply by virtue of being on the ‘buy-side’ of the
market. They are likely to need to spend substantial resources to form a very detailed assessment
of the value of the shares of the company taken public. We view book-building — that is pre-play
communication followed by PPS (Spatt and Srivastava, 1991) — as combining the acquisition of
the former sort of information with the preclusion of the latter. We leave these issues for further
research.
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